This paper investigates whether seasonalities in daily stock returns are related to the trading behavior of individual and institutional investors. The change in the investor structure of B-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen after the abolition of ownership restrictions in 2001 provides a unique testing environment. We show that day-of-the-week effects are attenuated after the market entrance of Chinese individual investors who had previously not been allowed to trade in B-shares. Our empirical results suggest that institutional rather than individual investors are a main driving force behind such anomalies. In addition, we find evidence of reduced index return autocorrelation and US spillover effects in the post-liberalization period.
Introduction
One of the most prominent anomalies challenging the hypothesis of stock market efficiency in its weak form is the day-of-the-week effect in daily stock returns. Following seminal articles by Cross (1973) and French (1980) documenting significantly negative Monday returns, a large body of literature has evolved to document abnormal daily returns for many stock markets around the globe. In particular, a number of studies (Barone, 1990; Solnik and Bousquet, 1990; Agrawal and Tandon, 1994) find average Tuesday returns in major stock markets outside the US to be significantly negative. The vast body of evidence concerning daily stock return seasonalities has led to a debate on possible origins of the observed phenomenon. Proposed explanations include the settlement procedure hypothesis (Lakonishok and Levi, 1982) , measurement errors (Rogalski, 1984) , the timing of earnings announcements (Peterson, 1990) , and the influence of institutional versus individual investor trading (Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990; Sias and Starks, 1995) . This paper adds to the debate about the role of institutional and individual investors in explaining stock return seasonalities. We study Chinese B-share markets before and after the abolition of ownership restrictions. Originally, only foreign predominantly institutional investors were allowed to trade in B-shares, while mostly private Chinese investors could only purchase and sell A-shares. In a move to foster market capitalization and liquidity of the B-share segment, Chinese authorities announced in February 2001 that domestic investors would be allowed to enter the B-share market.
The market entrance of private investors in China's B-share markets provides a unique testing ground for studying the relationship between stock return seasonalities and different investor groups. We analyze the marginal effect of ownership liberalization on day-of-theweek effects in daily Shanghai and Shenzhen B-Share Index returns. There is evidence of the negative Tuesday effect commonly observed in Asian stock markets. More importantly, we find a substantial reduction in daily seasonalities in the post-liberalization period. This result holds for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange and is robust to various modifications of our empirical approach. Moreover, the market entrance of domestic private investors seems to reduce return autocorrelation and spillover effects from the US. At the same time, the effect of local spillovers from A-share markets appears stronger during the post-liberalization period.
Our results are related to research providing evidence regarding the sophistication of Chinese investors. A recent study by Fifield and Jetty (2008) compares results from variance ratio tests before and after the deregulation of B-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The authors conclude that these market segments have become more efficient following the market entrance of domestic investors. Recent evidence on shareholder activism during the split-share structure reform suggests that domestic institutional investors have actively promoted shareholder rights. Empirical results reported by Liao et al. (2008) show that the compensation of tradable share owners and post-reform performance are positively related to domestic institutional ownership. Ng and Wu (2006) Another strand of literature dealing with price differentials between A-and B-share markets finds evidence that domestic investors have better information regarding fundamental asset values than do foreigners (Chakravarty et al. (1998) , Chan et al. (2008) ). Karolyi and Li (2003) document how domestic investors use this informational advantage to arbitrage away the B-share discount after the 2001 liberalization. By studying the influence of domestic private investor trading on day-of-the-week effects in stock returns, our paper provides indirect evidence of private investor sophistication in China.
A number of other papers study seasonalities in Chinese stock returns. For example, a recent paper by Girardin and Liu (2005) examines monthly and quarterly stock returns between 1993 and 2003. They find positive June and second quarter as well as negative December and fourth quarter effects, in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. A comprehensive study by Mitchell and Ong (2006) finds evidence of holiday effects and higher returns during the 6 months after Chinese Lunar New Year (from February to June). The evidence regarding day-of-the-week effects is rather mixed as conclusions from various studies seem to depend heavily on the particular choice of sample period and estimation approach. Even so, a number of studies (e.g. Mookerjee and Yu (1999), Cai et al. (2006) , Mitchell and Ong (2006) ) find some evidence of negative Tuesday returns in B-share markets, which is consistent with results for other Asian markets.
Most closely related to our paper is the work of Chen et al. (2001) who estimate standard dummy regressions as well as Integrated GARCH(1,1) models on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share and B-share index returns. They consider two subsamples, 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 , motivated by economic events such as the commencement of the company law and economic austerity programs implemented in 1994. The only abnormal daily return is found for Tuesday during the second sample period. However, the effect disappears once conditional heteroskedasticity, non-normal errors and spillover effects from the US are accounted for. While estimating various models for both A-share and B-share indices, none of the cited papers explicitly addresses the question to what extend the abolition of ownership restrictions has affected anomalies in stock returns in more recent years.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes stock markets in Mainland China, focusing on regulatory peculiarities. Our dataset and empirical approach are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Estimation results are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
Chinese Stock Market Regulation and Investor Structure
Since their reopening on November 26, 1990 and April 11, 1991, respectively, Chinese stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen have expanded rapidly. This development is manifest in both total market capitalization and in the number of firms listed. After about 17 years of operations, the number of listed companies has risen to 904 in Shanghai and to 736 in Shenzhen. At the end of 2007, the total market capitalization had reached about 5,700 billion Renminbi (RMB) in Shenzhen and about 27,000 billion RMB for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The development of the two exchanges has been asymmetric not only in terms of total market capitalization, but also in that larger companies generally tend to list in Shanghai (Girardin and Liu, 2005; Walter and Howie, 2006) .
China has been and in some respects still is a planned economy. Hence the transition to liberalized financial markets has been subject to strict regulation (see Walter and Howie (2006) for an overview). In particular, there are various regulatory details that impede arbitrage. First, there is an official ban on short-selling. Forcing investors to keep their trading accounts with the stock exchange allows authorities to effectively enforce anti-shortsale legislation. If there is a negative day-of-the-week effect and if short selling was allowed, rational arbitrageurs could sell stocks short in the morning of that day and buy them back the next day. Such trading activity would eventually result in the disappearance of the effect. In the absence of short-sales, however, such arbitrage is not possible. Second, the fact that the People's Bank of China (PBC) prohibits bank loans to be invested in stocks effectively prevents leveraged trading strategies and thus arbitrage. Third, derivatives markets have only recently begun to develop. Many studies highlight the importance of derivative markets for exploiting arbitrage opportunities (e.g. Kamara (1997), Faff and McKenzie (2002) ). For example, in the absence of futures contracts, investors face considerably higher transaction costs when trading against seasonalities in stock returns.
Summing up, these institutional details imply that both foreign institutional and domestic private investors will find it difficult to arbitrage away day-of-the-week effects in Chinese stock returns.
Ownership segmentation, however, has probably been the most noticeable peculiarity of stock markets in Mainland China. During the first decade after the reopening of stock exchanges, companies have typically issued different categories of shares. There are two classes of shares traded on stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. In addition to Ashares with ownership initially restricted to Chinese citizens (denominated in RMB), there are B-shares, which until February 2001 only foreign (mostly institutional) investors were allowed to purchase (denominated in USD or HKD). Furthermore, some companies have issued H-shares listed in Hong Kong (denominated in HKD) or N-shares listed in other overseas markets. In principle, all categories of shares are identical other than for who can own them.
Due to foreign investors' reluctance to invest in B-shares, and because firms planning to raise foreign capital could alternatively list in overseas markets, the market capitalization and liquidity of stocks listed in the B-share segment was rather low. In a move to foster its Most papers on Chinese equity markets implicitly assume that foreign institutions such as mutual funds accounted for most of B-share trading prior to liberalization (e.g. Fernald and Rogers (2002)). High information costs and fees make direct investment in an emerging stock market unattractive for a foreign individual investor. Nonetheless, this private investor may be willing to indirectly invest in the same assets via dedicated emerging market equity funds, which offer economies of scale in terms of transaction costs and hedging. Therefore, the assumption that foreign investors are mostly institutions appears quite plausible.
Data
We obtain daily data on the B-share indices of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from Thomson Financial Datastream. Our sample covers the period between January 3, 1994 and December 28, 2007. Observations before this period are excluded because of infrequent trading during the early days of both stock exchanges. Daily index returns are computed as the difference in logs between the closing value of the index on day t closing minus the closing value the previous day r t = ln(P t ) − ln(P t−1 ).
We split our sample motivated by the periods before and after ownership liberalization.
The first subsample covers all trading days before liberalization (January 3, 1994 -February 18, 2001 ). The day trading resumed after the announcement (February 28, 2001) distinguishing between individual trading days as well as total, pre-liberalization and postliberalization sample periods. The three rightmost columns report distributional characteristics for the full sample. Obviously, standard deviations, minima and maxima of daily returns are similar for all three periods considered. Only mean returns increase considerably after the abolition of ownership restrictions. Moreover, as can be seen from the Table, Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share index returns exhibit excess kurtosis and are skewed to the right. As expected, they are unlikely to be normally distributed. The last row of each panel of Table 1 reports results for the sign bias test of Engle and Ng (1993) for the full sample. Results for both Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share index returns indicate asymmetric reactions of conditional volatility to negative past return innovations, whereas coefficient estimates for size bias and combined tests (not reported) are generally statistically insignificant.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Comparisons of mean returns across days of the week and subsamples reveal patterns that are remarkably similar for both markets. Figure 1 visualizes these patterns. Evidently, the largest mean return in absolute value occurs on Tuesdays during the pre-liberalization period. This is true for Shanghai (-0.26%) and Shenzhen (-0.37%) as well. Interestingly, the negative Tuesday return is reversed for the post-liberalization sample.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Methodology
We employ a mean equation and GARCH framework for modeling daily B-share log index returns. There is a vast body of literature, beginning with Connolly (1989) , that highlights the importance of taking conditional heteroskedasticity into account when studying day-ofthe-week effects in stock returns. Our general approach is to include interaction terms with a dummy variable for the post-liberalization period in order to draw conclusions about the marginal effect of the regime change on various parameters of our model. More specifically, we assume daily log returns to follow:
where r t denotes the daily log return on the Shanghai or Shenzhen B-share composite index, W j,t dummy variables for Monday through Friday, and D t a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during the post-liberalization period and 0 otherwise. Short-term return dynamics may be governed by price adjustment delays, trend effects and noise trading.
It is therefore necessary to include lagged returns in the mean equation since coefficient estimates for day-of-the-week effects may otherwise be biased. Additionally, including an interaction term of lagged returns and the post-liberalization dummy enables us to detect changes in the autocorrelation of returns, which can be inferred from the parameter estimate of β 1 .
Furthermore, in order to account for global, regional and local spillover effects, we include the log returns on the lagged US S&P 500 Composite Index (r U S t−1 ), the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (r
T W t
) and the corresponding Shanghai or Shenzhen A-share index (r A t ). Because of different time zones, we lag US stock index returns by one period. Again, we allow for a change in these effects by including multiplicative dummy terms. This enables us to distinguish changes in day-of-the-week effects due to a changing investor structure from potentially time-varying influences of US, Taiwanese and local Ashare markets. It is important to bear in mind that all coefficients on terms without dummies (α 1 ,..., α 5 , β 1 ,..., β 4 ) model day-of-the-week, autoregressive, and spillover effects for the whole sample period whereas coefficients on interaction terms (α 1 ,..., α 5 , β 1 ,..., β 4 ) can be interpreted as marginal changes in these effects in the post-liberalization period.
Following Glosten et al. (1993) , we assume conditional volatility (denoted h t ) to react asymmetrically to positive and negative past innovations in returns. This modeling approach is motivated by results from sign bias tests discussed in Section 3. In addition, we want to test the hypothesis of a shift in the level of conditional volatility in the postliberalization period. The variance equation of the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model can be written as:
where the usual stationarity condition (γ 1 + γ 2 + 1/2 γ 3 < 1) applies and I t denotes an indicator variable that is one if the lagged disturbance in returns was negative (ε t−1 < 0) and zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficient γ 3 measures the degree to which negative past return innovations have a stronger effect on conditional volatility than positive return shocks. A positive asymmetric response of conditional volatility is consistent with the well-known leverage effect of Black (1976) .
Notice that we use an additional dummy term to model changes in the intercept of the variance equation due to the change in investor structure. A significantly positive (negative) parameter estimate for γ 0 implies that the conditional variance of returns is higher (lower) during the post-liberalization period compared to the total sample period.
However, this model specification may seem rather restrictive as it implies that the regime change will only affect a single parameter of the variance equation. Hence we also estimate an alternative GJR-GARCH(1,1) model, which allows us to test the hypothesis of a parallel shift in all parameters of the proposed conditional volatility model. This modified model is given by:
The multiplicative dummy term enables us to determine the magnitude and significance of a potential shift in all parameters of our variance equation due to ownership liberalization.
A significantly positive (negative) parameter estimate for γ D implies that the relevant coefficients are higher (lower) during the post-liberalization period compared to the total sample period.
Sample statistics discussed in Section 3 show that Chinese B-share index returns exhibit skewness and excess kurtosis with respect to the standard normal distribution. Thus the usual assumption of normally distributed errors may be violated. We therefore estimate the above model by quasi-maximum likelihood relying on the robust variance-covariance estimator of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) . More precisely, we maximize the normal log likelihood using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method implemented under RATS 6.2 and suitable starting values. We emphasize that this procedure delivers correct inference even if the true error distribution may have fat tails. Alternatively, one can derive maximum likelihood estimates based on a specific fat-tailed error distribution such as Student's t-distribution and estimate the degrees of freedom parameter ν along the way.
In order to reduce the complexity of the model and as an additional robustness check,
we also employ a general-to-specific approach. First, we estimate the proposed general GJR-GARCH(1,1) model. We then exclude the coefficient with the highest p-value (lowest significance) and re-estimate the model. This procedure is iterated until all coefficients in the remaining specification are statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance.
Empirical Results
Parameter estimates for the proposed general and specific baseline models of stock returns are summarized in Table 2 . As pointed out above, the GARCH framework allows us to draw conclusions about the time series behavior of conditional volatility and possible structural changes. Coefficient estimates for γ 1 show that index return volatility is highly persistent.
Moreover, a significantly positive parameter estimate of γ 2 suggests that unexpected stock returns (ε 2 t−1 ) increase volatility. The evidence regarding asymmetric responses of stock return volatility to negative past return innovations is mixed. The parameter γ 3 is significantly positive at the 5% level in the general model for Shanghai, implying that negative surprises in returns have a stronger impact on volatility than do positive innovations. At the same time, the point estimate for γ 3 is statistically indistinguishable from zero in the three other cases.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The coefficient measuring a shift in the intercept (γ 0 ) is negative and significant for all return time series and models. This result indicates a decrease of stock return volatility in Chinese B-share markets after the abolition of ownership restrictions due to the trading activity of domestic private investors. This finding is in contrast to evidence of speculative behavior of Chinese investors entering the B-share market documented by Mei et al. (2005) .
Turning to estimation results for the mean equation, we find a strong positive autocorrelation of index returns as measured by highly significant β 1 coefficients. Yet significant point estimates for β 1 imply that this phenomenon is less pronounced during the period after the liberalization of stock ownership. This finding can be related to the changing investor structure of China's B-share markets during the post-liberalization period.
Previous US evidence presented by Sias and Starks (1997) shows that autocorrelation in daily returns of portfolios and individual stocks traded on NYSE increases with in-stitutional ownership. Possible explanations include short-term positive feedback trading by institutional investors (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Griffin et al., 2003) and institutional agents breaking up trades to reduce execution costs or camouflage informed trading (Barclay and Warner, 1993) . Our empirical evidence for Chinese B-share markets provides indirect support to this view.
Furthermore, parameter estimates for β 2 suggest that US market returns have a strong effect on stock returns in China's B-share segment, which is consistent with evidence in Chen et al. (2001) . Also, this finding is not surprising as we expect the B-share market, which is China's foreign share market, to be integrated with overseas stock markets to a certain extent. The influence of Taiwanese markets is less pronounced with point estimates of β 3 being generally significant but comparably small in magnitude. The linkage with domestic A-share markets appears stronger as mirrored by β 4 coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the shift of ownership regimes has a significant effect on the integration of China's B-share markets with other markets. Negative β 2 coefficients suggest that spillover effects from the US appear to be less strong after February 2001. The influence of A-share markets, by contrast, seems to increase after liberalization as reflected by large and highly significant β 4 coefficients.
Significant linkages between A-share and B-share markets can be interpreted in terms of information flows between both market segments as, for example, in Chui and Kwok (1998) .
Along these lines, the growing influence of A-share market movements may be due to market integration after liberalization. Moreover, our results are consistent with the notion of a changing investor structure affecting daily return dynamics. Foreign institutional investors, who account for all trading in B-shares during the pre-liberalization period, are inclined to react to news from overseas markets, thus causing significant US spillover effects in daily returns. The post-liberalization period, by contrast, witnesses the growing influence of domestic private investors who are probably more concerned about local short-term market developments.
Most importantly, results for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share market imply that there are day-of-the-week effects and that these effects are most pronounced for Tuesday. In all four cases, the coefficient estimates of α 2 are significant at the 1% level. In addition, there is some but weaker evidence of a negative Wednesday effect in both markets and a Thursday effect in the Shenzhen B-share market. The finding of a negative Tuesday effect is consistent with long-standing evidence for Asian markets (Jaffe and Westerfield, 1985; Agrawal and Tandon, 1994) . In contrast to previous evidence for China (Chen et al., 2001 ), the effect is robust to the inclusion of spillover terms. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Tuesday effects in Chinese stock markets during the 1997 -2001 period simply reflect transmitted Monday effects from the US. The literature shows that since the beginning of the 1990s, the Monday effect in US stock returns has disappeared (Kamara, 1997; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Gu, 2003) .
At the same time, significant estimates of α 2 and α 3 suggest that the observed dayof-the-week effects are reduced during the post-liberalization period. This is also true for the Thursday effect in Shenzhen (α 4 ). Thus trading activities of Chinese private investors entering the B-share markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen appear to have mitigated abnormal daily returns. This empirical result leads to the conclusion that day-of-the-week effects in Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share markets are instead explained by foreign institutional investor trading. Such reasoning is in accordance with previous US evidence showing that stocks with higher institutional ownership exhibit stronger daily seasonalities (Sias and Starks, 1995) .
It is important to notice that this result is not due to time variation in spillovers from US markets. As pointed out above, our empirical specification permits the separate estimation of the marginal effects of seasonalities and global market integration. Even though we find a simultaneous reduction in both daily return seasonals and US influence, the two phenomena are in fact distinct. Along the same lines, one may argue that the entrance of domestic investors in B-share markets has led to an integration of A-share and B-share markets in the post-liberalization period and thus to a reduction of day-of-the-week effects. We emphasize that our results concerning seasonalities in B-share returns are robust to including A-share spillovers in our baseline model. Moreover, it is conceivable that our empirical results on the post-liberalization reduction in day-of-the-week effects may be due to factors other than ownership structure, which affect both A-share and B-share returns. Examples include other regulatory regime shifts, changing government privatization policies, general economic conditions, and the like. We therefore test the proposed model of returns on A-share index data for the same sample pe-riod, including the B-share liberalization dummy. If our results are due to common factors affecting both markets, but not the liberalization of the B-share market, the coefficients on dummy interaction terms (α 1 ,...,α 5 , β 1 ,..., β 4 ) should be statistically different from zero for the model of A-share indices. As can be seen from Table 3 , this is not the case. We find no evidence of reversed seasonalities in daily A-share returns after February 19, 2001, except for a Wednesday effect in the case of Shenzhen. Furthermore, neither US nor B-share returns appear to significantly influence A-share returns. In sum, estimation results for Ashare markets lend further support to our conclusion that the market entrance of domestic investors has had a significant effect on day-of-the-week effects in B-share markets.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
To further investigate the robustness of our empirical results, we conduct additional tests where the empirical approach to modeling B-share returns is modified with respect to the number of coefficients of our GJR-GARCH(1,1) model, the assumed structural change in conditional volatility, the sample period, alternative regional spillover effects, and the assumed error distribution.
Applying the general-to-specific procedure outlined above provides a robustness check for our empirical results. As can be seen from the above discussion of estimation results in Table 2 , our main findings also hold true for the more parsimonious specifications obtained from iteratively dropping terms from the general model. Day-of-the-week (especially Tuesday) effects, autocorrelation, the level of conditional volatility as well as the influence of US spillover effects are reduced during the post-liberalization period whereas the impact of A-share spillovers appears to increase.
As pointed out in Section 4, the assumption that the change in investor structure only affects the level of conditional volatility may seem restrictive. Therefore, as an additional robustness check, we complement our analysis by estimating the alternative GJR-GARCH(1,1) model given by Equations 1 and 3. Coefficient estimates for γ D (not reported) are negative and significantly different from zero for both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets.
Thus, in addition to finding evidence for a decrease in the level of conditional volatility, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a simultaneous structural change in all coefficients of the variance equation. At the same time, our empirical findings regarding day-of-the-week effects in index returns are robust to both models of conditional volatility.
We also investigate a shorter sample period for two reasons. First, we want to make sure that our main results are not specific to the 1994 -2007 period. More specifically, we cut off 3 years of observations at either end of the sample to maintain its symmetry around the liberalization date. The shorter sample thus covers trading days between January 2, 1997 and December 31, 2004. Second, by setting the starting point after November 16, 1996, we address the issue of varying price change limits prior to this date and their potential effects on seasonalities in returns (Mookerjee and Yu, 1999) . Parameter estimates are presented in Table 4 . Some of the significant coefficients in our baseline model are not robust to our general-to-specific procedure. More importantly, estimation results for the shorter sample period generally confirm the robustness of our previous results. We find a significant reduction in negative Tuesday effects in the post-liberalization period as well as reduced autocorrelation of returns and a diminished (increased) role of spillovers from US (A-share) markets.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Next, we analyze the effect of alternative regional spillover hypotheses on our estimation results. We replace the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index as a proxy for regional influences with the Nikkei 225, the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), or the Hang Seng index from Hong Kong. Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. Interestingly, the effect of Japanese stock market index returns on China's B-share markets is not significant suggesting a low degree of bilateral market integration. Spillover effects from South Korea are only significant in the case of Shenzhen. On the contrary, there is strong evidence of regional spillovers from Hong Kong, which are however attenuated after the market entrance of domestic investors. In addition, the coefficient measuring the influ- [Insert Table 5 about here] Finally, we investigate whether our main results are sensitive to alternative assumptions about the distribution of error terms. In additional estimations, we explore the effect of assuming t-distributed errors on our empirical findings. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates (not reported) suggest that our key results, i.e. the reduction in negative Tuesday effects, autocorrelation, conditional volatility and US spillover effects in the postliberalization period, also hold under this alternative estimation approach. Second, we detect a strong influence of the US stock market on the B-share segment of both stock exchanges. Again, this effect is reduced during the post-liberalization period.
Our main findings are robust across exchanges, models, sample periods, and various other modifications of our empirical setup.
Our empirical results regarding day-of-the-week effects are in line with previous evidence on investor structure and return seasonalities in the US. Market microstructure arguments put forth by Sias and Starks (1995) (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Chan et al., 2008) . In particular, the findings presented in this paper are consistent with those of Karolyi and Li (2003) 
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